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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CORPORATE
TAXATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES




It is absolutely essential that companies operating in two or more
EC countries should not be penalized in tax terms and thus
placed at a disadvantage compared with companies whose
activities are confined to national territory.1
On June 11, 1990, the Finance Ministers of the Member States of the
European Communities2 agreed unanimously on a package of three
proposals concerning corporate taxation.' These measures deal with (1)
* This article takes account of developments up to October 31, 1992.
** Lie. Juris, 1989, University of Brussels; LL.M, 1990, University of Georgia School
of Law; 1990-91, International Intern, Troutman, Sanders, Lockerman & Ashmore, Atlanta,
Georgia; S.J.D. Candidate, The George Washington University, National Law Center. I am
grateful to Natsu S. Jenga for reviewing this article.
1. Single Market Increasingly Becoming a Reality for Firms, EC PRESS RELEASE, (Brussels
Press), Nov. 28, 1990, at 1 (citing EC Commissioner Christiane Scrivener) [hereinafter Single
Market Reality].
2. Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal,
Spain, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom are the current Member States of the
European Community ("EC"). The plural "European Communities" refers to the following:
the European Economic Community ("EEC"), the European Community for Coal and Steel
("ECCS"), and the European Atomic Energy Community ("EURATOM"). TREATY
ESTABLISHING A SINGLE COUNCIL AND A SINGLE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES, Apr. 8, 1965, 4 ILM 776 (1965) [hereinafter MERGER TREATY].
3. Agreement on Three Directives for the Harmonization of Direct Taxation, WORLD TAX
NEWS, June 1990, at 21 [hereinafter Agreement on Three Directives]; EC Finance Ministers
Adopt Directives to Eliminate Risks of Double Taxation, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 143, at
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
the taxation of cross-border mergers and reorganizations; (2) the taxation
of cross-border payments of dividends between subsidiaries and their
parent companies; and (3) transfer pricing disputes. The main aim of this
new legislation is to eliminate all forms of double taxation incurred by EC
corporations setting up in other Member States. This double taxation is
due to the frequent overlap of taxing jurisdictions.
At the present time, there are twelve tax territories in the
Community, each with its own tax system. Companies operating
in two or more Member States are taxed by each of the national
tax administrations concerned. Although a number of bilateral
double taxation agreements have, in some cases, helped to reduce
the extent of these obstacles to transfrontier activities, they leave
much to be desired when it comes to satisfying the requirements
of the internal market.4 This is because they do not cover all
bilateral relations between Member States, do not completely
abolish double taxation... and entail considerable administrative
complications for companies.'
The formal vote on this new EC legislation took place on June 11,
1990, when the Finance Ministers approved the entire package after
twenty-one years of debate. 6 This is the first EC legislation on direct
taxation, apart from a 1979 directive which merely dealt with mutual
assistance between tax authorities.7 In that sense, this agreement is a
G-3 (July 25, 1990) [hereinafter EC Finance Ministers Adopt Directives]; Council Reaches
Long-Awaited Agreement on Corporate Taxation, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 95,505 (199 1)
[hereinafter Council Reaches Agreement]; EC Tax Commissioner Sets Priorities, 169 J. ACCT.
25, 26 (1990); Howard M. Liebman & Fussell M. Patten, TPI Country Survey: European
Community, 17 TAx PLANNING INT'L REv. 28 (1990); Removing Tax Barriers - New
Measures to Encourage Cross-Border Co-Operation, ERNST & YOUNG EC BRIEF 1 (Aug.
1990); John J. Goldsworth, EC Ministers Agree on Direct Tax Measures, at Last!, 2 TAx
NOTES INT'L 665 (1990); see also 1 EUROPE 1992: LAW & STRATEGY 10-12 (1990).
4. This term is synonymous to the popular term "common market" and to the term "single
market." According tothe EEC Treaty, this market "shall comprise an area without internal
frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in
accordance with the provisions of the Treaty." TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
ECONoMIc COMMUNrrY [EEC TREATY] art. 8a §2, 298 U.N.T.S. 3, 11.
5. Single Market Reality, supra note 1, at 2.
6. EC Council Approves Package of Directives to Eliminate Risks of Double Taxation, Daily
Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 114, at G-1 (June 13, 1990) [hereinafter EC Council Approves Package];
Finance Ministers Give Nod to Corporate Tax Package, 1992-The External Impact of
European Unification, (BNA) No. 9, at 6 (July 27, 1990).
7. The Council Directive concerning mutual assistance by the competent authorities of
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"historic decision." 8 Until recently, the harmonization 9 of indirect taxes
(value-added tax ("VAT"), customs duties, and excise duties)"0 was
proceeding at a much faster pace than the harmonization of direct taxes
(corporate taxes, capital taxes, and income taxes). 1 Originally, the EC
gave priority to indirect taxes because "there was no way that two major
tax projects could be conducted at the same time."" The Member States
needed financial stability and were therefore unable to adjust their income
at both the direct and the indirect tax levels.
13
This important breakthrough results from the momentum of the 1992
program.' 4 Since taxation is very sensitive to national demands, the EC
Council has often encountered resistance when trying to legislate in the tax
area."5 For instance, Germany, since 1984, has blocked the adoption of
Member States in the field of direct taxation and value-added tax is published in 1979 O.J. (L
331) 22, 28. "[This] directive . . . added little to the powers the Member States already
possessed under double tax treaties with other Member States." Progress Towards European
Community Tax Harmonization, WORLD TAX NEWS, Dec. 1990, at 1. For a short history of
the harmonization of direct taxation in the EC, see MARK BREALEY & CONNOR QUIGLEY,
COMPLETING THE INTERNAL MARKET OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNTY, 1992 HANDBOOK 221
(1989).
8. A Companies' Europe, EC PRESS RELEASE, (Brussels Press), June 12, 1990, at 1.
9. In article 100 of the EEC TREATY the term "approximation" is used. EEC TREATY,
supra note 4, art. 100. However, this article will use the terms "approximation,"
"standardization," and "harmonization" interchangeably.
10. For an explanation of the situation of indirect taxation in the EC, see GEERT LOWAGIE
& PATRICK KELLEY, Value-Added Tax in the European Community After 1992, 4 Tax Notes
Int'l 1047 (1992); Terra, VAT in the EEC: The Place of Supply, 26 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
449, 455 (1989); Michel V. M. Van Beck, Indirect Taxation and 1992, 9 NW. J. OF INT'L L.
& Bus. 552, 552 (1999); Donald W. Parker, The Value-Added Tax in the European Economic
Community, 11 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 155, 155 (1988); VAT Proposal Cleared for
Signature at EC Finance Ministers Meeting, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 223, at G-4 (Dec. 4,
1990). For recent developments, see EC Finance Ministers Adopt Directives Harmonizing
VAT, Excise Duty Rates, Daily Tax Rep.(BNA) No. 204, at G-2 (1992).
11. Peter Cussons et al., European Community Direct Tax Measures, 17 TAX PLANNING
INT'L REV. 11, 14 (1990); see also Progress Toward European Community Tax Harmonization,
supra note 7, at 1.
12. Kathleen Matthews, Expect U.S. Tax Treaty with EC, Commission Official Tells
Conference, 49 TAX NOTES 507, 508 (1990) (statement of Mr. Michel Petite, a staff member
of the economics and taxation cabinet of the EC in Brussels, Belgium, speaking on October 16,
1990, at the Conference on Taxation, Trade and Investment in the European Community).
13. Id.
14. See Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the
European Council, COM (85)310 final at 3, reprinted in 2 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 97 (1990).
15. "Tax is one of the [EC's] great battlegrounds. [It is] . . . an area where national
governments guard their tax-setting prerogatives so jealously and where each can wield a veto
to block any [EC] action." David Buchan, New Iron Lady Ventures onto EC' Tax-Setting
50 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [Vol. 13
the new tax legislation due to a dispute with the Netherlands. 6 The EC
Member States' tax sensitivity is conspicuously reflected in the Single
European Act ("SEA"), which requires unanimity for the adoption of tax
measures, but allows a qualified majority for most other decisions. 7
Because of the unanimity requirement and Germany's opposition, it took
many years of negotiations to attain agreement. 8 As a matter of fact, the
oldest proposals had been on the table since 1969.1'
The new legislation consists of" the Council Directive on the
common system of taxation applicable to mergers, divisions, transfers of
assets, and exchanges of shares concerning companies of different Member
States (the "Merger Directive"); 2' the Council Directive on the common
system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and
subsidiaries of different Member States (the "Parent-Subsidiary
Directive");22 and the Convention on the elimination of double taxation
in connection with the adjustment of profits of associated enterprises (the
"Transfer Pricing Convention").
23
These three tax measures will be complemented by two directives
announced by the EC Commission (the "Commission")24 in April,
Battleground, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1989, at 6; see Michael Maskall & Peter Cussons,
European Trends in Direct Taxation Towards 1992: Survey of Tax Considerations as Applied
to European Corporations, 16 TAX PLANNING INT'L REV. 3, 10 (1989).
16. See infra Chapter III. B.
17. EEC TREATY, supra note 4, art. 18; see David Williams, Taxation in the European
Community: 1992-And Then What?, 16 TAX PLANNING INT'L REv. 21, 21 (1989).
18. Council Reaches Agreement, supra note 3.
19. These are the Commission proposals of January 16, 1969, on a common tax system for
mergers, divisions, and contributions of assets occurring between companies of different
Member States and on a common tax system for parent companies and subsidiaries of different
Member States. 1969 O.J. (C 39) 1. The proposal on the elimination of double taxation in
connection with the adjustment of transfers of profits between associated enterprises (arbitration
procedure) dates from November 29, 1976. 1976 O.J. (C 301) 4. However, these proposals
were updated by the Commission in May 1989. See John J. Goldsworth, Update on EC
Directives on Harmonizing Direct Taxes, 2 TAX NOTES INT'L 912, 912 (1990).
20. CLIFFORD CHANCE, THE CCH GUIDE TO 1993, CHANGES IN EEC LAW 22-29 (2d ed.
1990).
21. Council Directive 90/434, 1990 O.J. (L 225) 1 [hereinafter Merger Directive]. For a
summary of this Directive, see Cussons et al., supra note 11, at 20.
22. Council Directive 90/435, 1990 O.J. (L 225) 6 [hereinafter Parent-Subsidiary
Directive]. For a summary of this Directive, see Cussons et al., supra note 11, at 20.
23. Convention 90/436, 1990 O.J. (L 225) 10 [hereinafter Transfer Pricing Convention].
For a summary of this Convention, see Cussons et al., supra note 11, at 18; see also Eric
Osterweil & Caoive M. Collins, New Convention for Transfer Pricing Dispute Arbitration,
INT'L TAX REP., Dec. 1990, at 1.
24. The functional difference between the Commission and the Council in the legislative
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1990,25 and which were proposed on November 28, 1990, by EC
Commissioner Christiane Scrivener, who is responsible for taxation and
the customs union.26 The two proposed directives are (1) the Council
Directive on the abolition of withholding tax on interest and royalty
payments made between parent companies and subsidiaries in different
Member States (the "Interest and Royalties Directive") 7 and (2) the
Council Directive on the arrangements for the taking into account by
undertakings of the losses of their permanent establishments and
subsidiaries situated in other Member States (the "Carry-Over of Losses
Directive").28
These five measures should remove all substantial problems of double
taxation and should allow European companies to take full advantage of
the single market.29 Indeed, the general objective of the new legislation
is "to ensure that enterprises which operate in several Member States do
not receive less favorable treatment in fiscal terms than . . . enterprises
which confine themselves to a single country."30 Through the
elimination of the existing tax disincentives "for companies to invest
across borders because the tax treatment is more attractive for investment
made within one country," the Commission seeks to encourage "the
process of industrial restructuring needed in order for the [EC] to face up
to the competitive challenge of the internal market. ""'
The Merger Directive and the Parent-Subsidiary Directive expressly
state that "Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and
administrative provisions necessary to comply with [these Directives] not
later than 1 January 1992."32 EC Commissioner Scrivener has stressed
process within the EC is that "the Commission proposes, the Council disposes." See EEC
TREATY, arts. 145-63, amended by the MERGER TREATY. On the legislative process in tax
matters, see Price Waterhouse Outlines EC Tax Legislative Process, 4 Tax Notes Int'l 1140
(1992).
25. Council Reaches Agreement, supra note 3.
26. EC Tax Commissioner Introduces Two Proposals to Remove Tax Barriers, Daily Tax
Rep. (BNA) No. 232, at G-3 (Dec. 3, 1990) [hereinafter Two Proposals]; Kathleen Matthews,
European Commission Introduces Two New Corporate Tax Directives, 3 TAX NOTES INT'L 16,
16 (1991).
27. Cussons et al., supra note 11, at 16.
28. See generally EC PRESS RELFASE, (Brussels Press), Nov. 28, 1990 [hereinafter EC
PRESS RELEASE Nov. 28, 1990]; Cussons et al., supra note 11, at 15-16.
29. Cussons et al., supra note 11, at 15-16; Commission Takes New Approach to Company
Taxation, 655 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 (1990) [hereinafter Commission Takes New
Approach].
30. Council Reaches Agreement, supra note 3.
31. Two Proposals, supra note 26, at G-3.
32. Directives contain the goals and deadlines to be achieved, while their implementation
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
the importance of having this legislation in place before the 1992
deadline." Several Member States have started the implementation
process ahead of time, while others have not been able to meet the
deadline Scrivener set. 4 The Transfer Pricing Convention, on the other
hand, is a multilateral convention and requires ratification by the twelve
national legislatures. 35 This process will take at least a year;36 in fact,
by mid 1992, only two states had ratified it.3 The Convention will enter
into force on the first day of the third month following that in which the
last Member State deposits its instrument of ratification. 8 Concerning
the proposed Interest and Royalties Directive and the Carry-Over of
Losses Directive, EC Commissioner Scrivener "hopes to get approval of
[these] proposals in time for them to be transposed into national legislation
by [January 1, 1993]. "3  As of October 31, 1992, the Directives had not
been adopted, and thus his deadline cannot be met. It is hoped that the
Interest and Royalties Directive will be approved under the British
presidency of the EC Council of Ministers, which concludes at the end of
1992.40 No major opposition is expected to this Directive, which is a
mere extension of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive.4" The Carry-Over of
is left to the discretion of each Member State. Merger Directive, supra note 21, art. 12(1);
Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 22, art. 8(1).
33. Commission Takes New Approach, supra note 29, at 2.
34. See, e.g., Britain Preparing to Implement EC Taxation Directives, Will Affect U.S.
Firms, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 66, at G-1 (Apr. 5, 1991); Patrick L. Kelly, Belgian
Legislation Needed to Implement New EC Directives Reviewed, 2 TAX NOTES INT'L 1028, 1029
(1990); Christine Guillerm-Kirk, France Must Make Only Minor Changes to Implement New
Directives, 2 TAX NOTES INT'L 1034, 1034 (1990); Alex Morris, Spain Adopts Implementing
Legislation for EC Mergers Directive, 4 TAx NOTES INT'L 747 (1992) and Patrick Kelley,
Belgium Completes Implementation of EC Parent/Subsidiary Directive, 4 TAX NOTES INT'L 7
(1992).
35. Transfer Pricing Convention, supra note 23, arts. 17-18. The instruments of ratification
must be deposited at the office of the Secretary-General of the EC Council.
36. EC Finance Ministers Adopt Directives, supra note 3.
37. Scrivener Proposes Communication on Corporate Tax Harmonization, Daily Tax Rep.
(BNA) No. 133, at G-2 (1992).
38. Transfer Pricing Convention, supra note 23, arts. 18.
39. Two Proposals, supra note 26, at G-3.
40. Eliminating Corporate Double Taxation is Post-1992 EC Priority, Official Says, Daily
Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 209, at G-1 (1992); EC Wants to End Double Taxation by End of Year,
Scrivener Says, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 197, at G-1, G-2 (1992).
41. John Turro, Commission Readies Vote on Proposed Interest and Royalty Directive-Loss
Directive Not Considered Front-Burner Issue, 3 TAx NOTES INT'L 617 (1991). EC
Commissioner Scrivener expressed hope that the Directive will be adopted at the November
23, 1992, meeting of the Council of Ministers. EC Wants to End Double Taxation by End of
[Vol. 13
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Losses Directive is more controversial 42 and its adoption is likely to take
more time. 43  Since the EC Council adopted the Parent-Subsidiary
Directive, no major opposition is likely to these two proposals, which are
merely an extension of that Directive."
With this new legislation, the EC has abandoned its plan to set a
uniform rate of corporate taxation across the twelve Member States.45
This would be very difficult to achieve in view of each Member State's
"unique method of generating revenues from both direct and indirect
taxing methods." 46 Instead, the EC Commission intends to take a "new
approach," based on "mutual recognition and coordination between the
Member States, the main aim of which is to remove the spectre of double
taxation. "4 According to EC Commissioner Scrivener:
[I]n the time leading up to 1993, Community action should
concentrate on the measures essential for completing the internal
market . . . . [A]lthough harmonization will still have a role to
play in certain cases, priority [should] be given to mutual
Year, Scrivener Says, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 197, at G-1, G-2 (1992).
42. This is due in part to the fact that "[tihe domestic legislation of three member
states-Belgium, Greece, and Italy--currently does not allow loss relief between parents and
subsidiaries." John Turro, supra note 41.
43. Eliminating Corporate Double Taxation is Post-1992 EC Priority Official Says, Daily
Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 209, at G-1 (1992).
44. See infra chapters V and VI.
45. Company Taxation and Withholding on Dividends, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
3217.10 (1975). This plan was put forward originally in a proposed Directive of 23 July 1975
on the harmonization of systems of company taxation and of withholding taxes on dividends.
1975 O.J. (C 253) 18. The Commission officially withdrew this draft directive on April 18,
1990. Under the Commission's 1975 proposal, "each Member State would apply a single rate
of corporation tax to the distributed or undistributed profits of enterprises. This rate could not
be less than 45% nor more than 55% and would be considered the normal rate. Exceptions
would be made if a Member State [had] economic, regional, or social reasons for applying a
different rate. In those cases the Commission [had] to be consulted." See Two-Part Corporate
Tax Plan Emphasizes Rate Convergence, 1992-The External Impact of European Unification,
(BNA) No. 4, at 5 (Apr. 20, 1990) [hereinafter Corporate Tax Plan]; A chart illustrating the
existing diversity of direct corporate taxes is reprinted in Cussons et al., supra note 11, at 22.
For a summary of each Member State's direct tax system, see Thomas H. Gibson & Meryl A.
Rains, Europe 1992 Removing Fiscal Barriers: The Unlikely Spectre of Tax Harmonization,
13 HASTINGS INT'L & Comp. L. REV. 531, 536-84 (1990).
46. Gibson & Rains, supra note 45, at 532.
47. Commission Takes New Approach, supra note 29, at 655; see Liebman, supra note 3,
at 29.
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recognition and the approximation of national laws in meeting the
needs that arise as the internal market is further developed.48
The new approach has, consequently, important consequences for the post-
1993 objectives."
Although the Commission has dropped the idea of a single corporate
tax rate, it is still concerned about "the effects on the single market of
disparities in the burden of taxation on companies across the Community.
To this end it [has set] up a committee of experts to look into the effects
on the single market of these different rates." 50 Two key issues will be
addressed by this committee: "whether the differences in corporate
taxation distort or influence investment decisions, and whether market
forces and competition among national fiscal systems will suffice to
eliminate these differences or [whether] Community legislation will be
necessary."5" Furthermore, this committee will have to address a
number of questions:52 (1) whether any action, at the EC level, should
concentrate on one or more elements of corporate taxation-namely, the
different corporate taxation systems, the differences in tax treatment
associated with the legal status of companies, and the tax base or the tax
rate; (2) whether any measures envisaged lead to harmonization,
approximation, or the establishment of a framework for national
legislation; and (3) if measures need to be taken to evaluate the effect on
Community objectives such as cohesion, environmental protection, and the
fair treatment of small and medium sized firms. "In the light of the
results of this study, the committee will decide what, if any, further
proposals should be brought forward."" This committee met for the first
time on January 21, 19 9 1 .' The committee reported on the progress of
its work to EC Commissioner Scrivener in July, 1991.' 5 On March 18,
48. John Goldsworth, EEC Commission Adopts New Approach to Company Taxation, 2 TAX
NOTES INT'L 550, 551 (1990); see Howard M. Liebman, Interview with Mme. Christiane
Scrivener, 17 TAX PLANNING INT'L REV. 3, 3 (1990).
49. It is said that "[tihe Commission's new approach is in keeping with the principle of
'subsidiary,' a new word in the language of Eurospeak. . . ." which suggests, when used in
connection with the new approach on taxation, that "rigid harmonization may not be required."
Goldsworth, supra note 48, at 550; see Single Market Reality, supra note 1, at 1.
50. Commission Takes New Approach, supra note 29 at 2.
51. Corporate Tax Plan, supra note 45, at 5.
52. See Cussons et al., supra note 11, at 16; Goldsworth, supra note 48, at 551.
53. Cussons et al., supra note 11, at 16.
54. Expert Committee Discusses Corporate Taxation in the Single Market, 674 Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 (1991).
55. Id. at 2.
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1992, the committee presented its report, the so-called Ruding Report on
Corporate Taxation, named after the committee's Chairman, former Dutch
Finance Minister Onno Ruding. 56 On June 24, 1992, EC Commissioner
Scrivener in turn issued a first reaction to the Ruding Report in the format
of guidelines on planned EC Commission measures in the post-1992 single
market. 57  Commissioner Scrivener also plans "to launch a
comprehensive process of consultation with Member States before
"51formulating proposals for legislation ....
It should be noted that many tax matters among EC Member States
will continue to be governed by the network of bilateral-double-taxation
treaties. This network is very extensive, but not complete. 59  In this
respect, "it is tempting to speculate that in due course the Commission
may propose a single multilateral treaty governing all relationships among
EC members to replace the current bilateral network. This will probably
not be possible until a greater degree of harmonization of national tax
systems has taken place."' The newly adopted tax measures bring this
harmonization closer.
II. THE MERGER DIRECTIVE
A. Purpose
The Merger Directive 61 aims to remove artificial obstacles to
mergers and reorganizations62 of corporations, that is, obstacles created
56. Scrivener Proposes Communication on Corporate Tax Harmonization, Daily Tax Rep.
(BNA) No. 123, at G-2 (1992). For the full text of the Ruding Report, see 4 TAX NOTES
INT'L 731 (1992) and Jens Blumenberg & Richard Minor, Ruding Committee Report
Unveiled-New Measures Proposed for Company Taxes in the EC, 4 TAX NOTES INT'L 563
(1992).
57. Scrivener Proposes Communication on Corporate Tax Harmonization, Daily Tax Rep.
(BNA) No.123, at G-2 (1992).
58. John Goldsworth, EC Commission Review Ruding Committee Report, Suggests Member
State Consultation, 5 TAX NOTES INT'L 177 (1992).
59. Cussons et al., supra note 11, at 22.
60. Id. at 16-17. "A natural result of a [such a single] treaty would be to the EC act as
negotiator for treaties with the rest of the world." In this respect there are some expectations
that the EC will negotiate a double taxation treaty with the U.S. in the near future. Others,
however, do not believe that this will be the case. See Matthews, supra note 12, at 507.
61. Merger Directive, supra note 21, at 1. See generally Johnathan S. Schwarz, New
Strategies for Cross-Border Mergers, Acquisitions, and Reorganizations, 2 J. INT'L TAX. 51
(1991); Eric Tomsett, The Directive on Cross-Border Mergers, WORLD TAX NEWS, Dec. 1990,
at 2.
62. The term reorganization, for the purposes of this article, includes divisions, transfers
1992]
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mainly by taxation and corporate law. In so doing, the Directive will
facilitate desirable mergers and reorganizations, i.e., those which increase
companies' productivity and improve their competitive position.63 "[Such
an increase and improvement] has always been the Commission's basic
concern in its approach to company taxation."" If the internal market
is to operate effectively, it is necessary for EC enterprises to attain a size
that improves their competitive position in the world market.65 Until the
full implementation of the Merger Directive, the main obstacle to
corporate growth is the tax cost of mergers and reorganizations." This
is because many countries' tax systems simply discourage mergers and
reorganizations "by treating transfers of assets and shareholdings as if they
were made at market values and taxing the corresponding gains arising
[from the transfer]." 67  As a result, primary concern of the Merger
Directive was the removal of the tax cost of cross-border mergers and
reorganizations, along with safeguarding the interests of the country of the
acquired company. 68
B. Content69
The core of the Merger Directive consists of a general tax deferment
for the entire capital gain on liquidations resulting from a merger70 or a
of assets, and exchanges of shares.
63. Tax Treatment of Mergers, Split-ups and Transfers of Assets, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 3213.01 (1991) [hereinafter Tax Treatment].
64. A Companies' Europe, supra note 8, at 1-2.
65. Id. at 1.
66. Tax Treatment, supra note 63, 3213.01.
67. Tomsett, supra note 61, at 2.
68. Merger Directive, supra note 21, at 1.
69. For a discussion of all the issues involved, see generally Tax Treatment, supra note 63.
See generally Corporate Taxation Measures Published, 665 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1
(1990).
70. A "merger" is defined as:
an operation whereby one or more companies, on being dissolved without going
into liquidation, transfer all their assets and liabilities to another existing company
in exchange for the issue to their shareholders of securities representing the capital
of that other company, and, if applicable, a cash payment not exceeding 10% of
the nominal value, or, in the absence of a nominal value, of the accounting par
value of those securities, two or more companies, on being dissolved without going
into liquidation, transfer all their assets and liabilities to a company that they form,
in exchange for the issue to their shareholders of securities representing the capital
of that new company, and, if applicable, a cash payment not exceeding 10% of the
nominal value, or in the absence of a nominal value, of the accounting par value
1992] CORPORATE TAXATION
division.7" This system has the advantage of being simple to apply.72
As a matter of fact, it is already in effect in most of the Member States,73
but for budgetary reasons most countries limit its application to national
operations.74 Inherent in the fact that this system has not been applied
throughout the entire Community, however, is
the danger that mergers might always go in the same direction,
to the detriment of the countries with the most liberal tax policies
[. f . . . one Member State is less stringent in taxing
capital gains in international mergers than another State, mergers
would flow in the direction of the former State and would result
in losses of revenue. This would be incompatible with the
principles of tax neutrality and competition policy.7"
Under the new system, therefore, the tax on capital gains76 will be
deferred until the acquiring company 77 actually realizes these gains.
71
of those securities, a company, on being dissolved without going into liquidation,
transfers all its assets and liabilities to the company holding all the securities
representing its capital.
Merger Directive, supra note 21, at art. 2(a). For examples, see Tomsett, supra note 61, at
2-3.
71. A "division" is defined as:
an operation whereby a company on being dissolved without going into liquidation,
transfers all its assets and liabilities to two or more existing or new companies, in
exchange for the pro rata issue to its shareholders of securities representing the
capital of the companies receiving the assets and liabilities, and, if applicable, a
cash payment not exceeding 10%
of the nominal or par value of those securities. Merger Directive, supra note 21, art. 2(b).
For an example, see Tomsett, supra note 61, at 3.
72. Tax Treatment, supra note 63, 3213.12.
73. Tomsett, supra note 61 at 2; see EC Council Approves Package, supra note 6, at G-1.
"But under the existing situation, most national fiscal rules equate a cross-border fusion,
division or contribution of assets as a total or partial liquidation of the company putting in the
assets." Id.
74. "The provisions often exclude cross-border transactions, to prevent the use of mergers
and reorganizations to move profits and capital gains outside the tax jurisdiction of the country
in which they arise." Tomsett, supra note 61, at 2.
75. Tax Treatment, supra note 63, 3213.03.
76. These gains result from the difference between the real value of the assets and liabilities
transferred and their value for tax purposes. Tax Treatment, supra note 63, 1 3213.12.
77. For the definition of the terms transferring company, receiving company, acquired
company, acquiring company, and branch of activity, see Merger Directive, supra note 21,
art.2(e)-(i).
78. Merger Directive, supra note 21, art. 4(1); see Tax Treatment, supra note 63,
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This means that, under article 4 of the Directive, no tax is imposed on
capital gains at the time of the merger or the reorganization. For
example, in the case of a firm bringing with it into a fusion land,
factories, and buildings that appear on its balance sheet at below the
current market level, the tax authorities would not tax the capital gains
until the land, factory, and buildings were in fact sold.79 The Directive
only applies to mergers and reorganizations in which companies from at
least two EC Member States are involved."0 Furthermore, the Directive
"does not apply to the stamp or transfer duties that may arise on these
transactions . . . . In some countries . . this could involve substantial
liabilities. "s
To prevent tax evasion and to safeguard the taxing rights of the
acquired company's country
the Member States shall make the application of [the tax
deferment] conditional upon the receiving company's computing
any new depreciation and any gains or losses in respect of the
assets and liabilities transferred according to the rules that would
have applied to the transferring company or companies if the
merger or division had not taken place.82
In order to remove all tax impediments to cross-border mergers and
divisions, the Directive also prescribes favorable tax treatment of reserves
and provisions, losses, and cross-holdings of interests.8 3 First, the
receiving company's permanent establishment, situated in the Member
State of the transferring company, may carry over provisions and reserves
with the same tax exemptions that may have been granted to the
transferring company." Likewise, to the extent that the Member State
would apply provisions allowing the receiving company to take over the
3213.12; Corporate Taxation Measures Published, supra note 69, at 1.
79. This is the same system that currently applies to such activities, which take place at a
purely national level, according to the conclusions issued by the Council. EC Council
Approves Package, supra note 6, at G-1.
80. Merger Directive, supra note 21, art. 1. For an account of the impact of the Directive
can have on United States companies, see Karina Haum & David Tillinghast, A Primer on the
Impact of the EC Directive on Mergers and Divisions on U.S. Companies with Interests in
Europe, 3 TAx NOTES INT'L 575 (1991).
81. Tomsett, supra note 61, at 2, 4.
82. Merger Directive, supra note 21, art. 4(2).
83. See id. art. 5-7.
84. Id. art. 5.
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losses of the transferring company which had not yet been exhausted for
tax purposes, it shall extend those provisions to cover the take-over of
such losses by the receiving company's permanent establishments situated
within its territory.85 Finally, if the receiving company owns capital
stock of the transferring company, any gains accruing to the receiving
company on the cancellation of that stockholding is exempt from
taxation.86 In addition, "the Directive also provides that where the
shareholders of the transferring company receive securities in the acquiring
company, that allotment of securities should not in itself give rise to
taxation of the shareholders." 87  This provision applies to mergers,
divisions, and exchanges of shares.88
Article 10(1) concerns the special case of a transfer of a permanent
establishment. When a permanent establishment, which is situated in a
Member State other than that of the transferring company, is transferred
in a merger, a division, or a transfer of assets the latter state shall
renounce any right to tax that permanent establishment.89
Title III of the Directive concerns the transfer of assets.90 This title,
which consists of article 9 only, makes the provisions of article 4 (taxation
of capital gains deferred until actual realization), article 5 (treatment of
provisions and reserves), and article 6 (take over of losses not yet
85. Id. art. 6.
86. Id. art. 7.
87. Id. art. 8; Corporate Taxation Measures Published, supra note 69, at 1.
88. An "exchange of shares" is defined as:
an operation whereby a company acquires a holding in the capital of another
company such that it obtains a majority of the voting rights in that company in
exchange for the issue to the shareholders of the latter company, in exchange for
their securities, of securities representing the capital of the former company, and,
if applicable, a cash payment not exceeding 10% of the nominal value or, in the
absence of a nominal value, of the accounting par value of the securities issued in
exchange.
Merger Directive, supra note 21, art. 2(d).
89. For an example, see Tomsett, supra note 61, at 2, 5. Article 10(1) continues: "the
[sitate of the transferring company may," however, "reinstate in the taxable profits of that
company such losses of the permanent establishment as may previously have been set off
against the taxable profits of the company in that State and which have not been recovered."
Merger Directive, supra note 21, art. 10(1). Article 10(2) contains an exception in the event
the Member State of the transferring company levies taxes on the company's world-wide
profits. Id. art. 10(2). For further information on this exception, see Tax Treatment, supra
note 63, 3213.25; Tomsett, supra note 61, at 2, 5.
90. A "transfer of assets" is defined as "an operation whereby a company transfers without
being dissolved all or one or more branches of its activity to another company in exchange for
the transfer of securities representing the capital of the company receiving the transfer."
Merger Directive, supra note 21, art 2(c). For an example, see Tomsett, supra note 61, at 2-
3.
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provisions and reserves), and article 6 (take over of losses not yet
exhausted for tax purposes) applicable to transfers of assets. In addition,
article 10 (the transfer of a permanent establishment) also applies to a
transfer of assets.9"
The Merger Directive contains three "escape clauses"' or "anti-
avoidance provisions."93 Member States can refuse to apply the benefits
of the Merger Directive if a particular operation's principal objective is tax
evasion or tax avoidance' or a particular operation results in a company
that no longer fulfills the national requirements for employee participation
in the management of the company.95 Furthermore, the Merger Directive
does not apply to companies in an EC Member State which are considered
under a double-tax treaty between that Member State and a country outside
the EC to be resident, for tax purposes, in the non-EC Member State.96
This provision is designed to prevent such dually resident
companies from taking advantage of the directive when the tax
treaty in question provides for them to be taxed outside the EC
so that profits and gains that might otherwise have been taxed in
an EC country would escape tax in the EC.97
Important criticism has been voiced against this Directive stressing its
lack of relevance for most situations:9"
Although new tax laws to implement the reliefs provided by the
directive will be useful and indeed very welcome in some cases,
a careful examination of the definitions of mergers, divisions,
91. Merger Directive, supra note 21, art. 20.
92. Corporate Taxation Measures Published, supra note 69, at 1.
93. Tomsett, supra note 61, at 2, 6.
94. The Directive continues: "Mhe fact that one of the operations... is not carried out
for valid commercial reasons such as the restructuring or rationalization of the activities of the
companies participating in the operation may constitute a presumption that the operation has
tax evasion or tax avoidance as its principal objective or as one of its principal objectives."
Merger Directive, supra note 21, art. 1l(l)(a).
95. Id. art. 11(1)(b). According to article 11(2), article 11(l)(b) shall only apply as long
as no Community legislation containing equivalent rules on representation of employees on
company organs are applicable to the companies covered by this Directive. id. art. 11(2).
96. Id. art. 3(b).
97. Tomsett, supra note 61, at 2, 6.
98. Id. at 4.
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cover many of the procedures that multinational groups are likely
to plan to follow. The directive's provisions generally cover
situations in which a company in one EC member state transfers
its business to a company in another EC member state that then
carries on the business as a branch (permanent establishment) in
the first country . . . . In practice, however, . . . [m]ost
corporate groups operating in Europe prefer . . . to maintain a
separate subsidiary . in each country in which their business
is located. 99
Member States are required to implement this Directive by January
1, 1992"'° (except for Portugal which may delay the application of the
provisions concerning transfers of assets and exchanges of shares until
January 1, 1993).1°1
Il. THE PARENT-SuBsLARY DIREcTIvE °2
A. Purpose"°3
As explained above, the competitive strength of EC companies has to
be increased to guarantee the proper functioning of the common market.
An effective way to realize this is through the formation of corporate
groups consisting of parent companies and subsidiaries of different
Member States. Acquiring stock in related companies producing a
conglomerate controlled by one parent company is a common structure at
the international level. From a legal standpoint, no tax problem arises
when one company acquires an interest in another company.
Subsequently, however, the subsidiary's previously taxed profits are taxed
again when they are distributed to its parent. This is a major disadvantage
to a parent-subsidiary corporate structure set up in different EC Member
99. Tomsett further argues that this Directive would, however, become useful on the
creation of European companies. See id. at 4, 6.
100. Merger Directive, supra note 21, art. 12(1).
101. Id. art. 12(2).
102. Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 22, at 6. See generally Fraus Vanistenolael,
The Implication of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive in the EC-Comment on Some Unresolved
Questions, 5 TAx NOTES INT'L 599 (1992); Jonathan S. Schwarz, 24 EC Directives Cover
Cross-Border Income Flows, 2 J. INT'L TAX. 180 (1991); Tomsett, The Directive on
Parent/Subsidiary Taxation, WORLD TAX NEws, Dec. 1990, at 7.
103. The following section is based on Taxation of Parent Companies and Subsidiaries,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 3215.01 (1991).
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States. " The national tax provisions governing the relations between
parent companies and subsidiaries of the same Member State are generally
more advantageous than those applicable to parent companies and
subsidiaries of different Member States.1"5 This clearly penalizes those
companies setting up subsidiaries in other EC Member States. The
Parent-Subsidiary Directive aims at the removal of these hampering and
restricting tax provisions.
B. Content
Article 4 of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive addresses the problems
encountered with respect to double taxation of profit distributions.
10 6
The Member States can adopt either of two possible solutions. When a
parent company, by virtue of its association with its subsidiary, receives
distributed profits, the state of the parent company must either "refrain
from taxing such profits, or tax such profits while authorizing the parent
company to deduct from the amount of tax due that fraction of the
corporation tax paid by the subsidiary which relates to those profits."'°7
This choice constitutes the core of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. This
rule, however, does not apply to distributions in a liquidation.'
Some Member States already apply the system set forth in article
4.109 The Parent-Subsidiary Directive, however, extends the system
throughout the Community." 0
Because of the differences between the national provisions and
the differences between the various tax treaties, the tax burden on
dividends distributed by a subsidiary to its parent company would
vary depending on the source of the dividend. This could deflect
capital movements in the form of acquisitions of holdings and
lead to distortions of competition because companies might, for
104. Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 22, at 6.
105. Corporate Taxation Measures Published, supra note 69, at 1-2.
106. Article 1 specifies that the Directive applies "to distributions of profits received by
companies of that State which come from their subsidiaries of other Member States" and "to
distributions of profits by companies of that State to companies of other Member States of
which they are subsidiaries." Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 22, art. 1.
107. Id. art. 4.
108. Id. art. 4(1).
109. The United Kingdom, Denmark, France, and the Netherlands are examples. Tomsett,
supra note 102, at 7, 9; Taxation of Parent Companies and Subsidiaries, supra note 103,
3215.11.
110. Taxation of Parent Companies and Subsidiaries, supra note 103, 3215.01.
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tax reasons, be induced to acquire holdings in companies of one
country rather than another."'
Some states, however, limit the tax exemption to ninety or ninety-five
percent of the dividends received. "The remaining .. . [five or ten
percent] is considered a management cost of the holding already deducted
from the taxable profit of the parent company."" 2 Therefore, each
Member State has the option
of providing that any charges relating to the holding and any
losses resulting from the distributions of the profits of the
subsidiary may not be deducted from the taxable profits of the
parent company. Where the management costs relating to the
holding in such a case are fixed as a flat rate, the fixed amount
may not exceed 5% of the [distributed profits]."1 3
The definition of parent companies and subsidiaries is an important
issue. In attempting to define these terms, two problems have arisen.
First, there is a need to establish a minimum shareholding requirement,
and second, a minimum holding period." 4  For purposes of this
Directive only, the status of a parent company is attributed to a company
of a Member State that has a minimum holding of twenty-five percent of
the capital of a company of another Member State. 5 This implies that
a minority shareholder can qualify under the Directive as a parent
company.1 1 6 Through bilateral agreements, Member States may replace
the criterion of a twenty-five percent holding of the capital with that of a
holding of twenty-five percent of the voting rights. 7 Also, Member
States have the option of not conferring the status of "parent company" to
entities that fail to own and maintain the minimum shareholding for an
uninterrupted period of at least two years. 18 It is very important to
111. Id.
112. Id. 3215. 11.
113. Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 22, art. 4(2).
114. Taxation of Parent Companies and Subsidiaries, supra note 103, 3215.09.
115. Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 22, art. 3(1)(a).
116. Matthews, supra note 12, at 508.
117. Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 22, art. 3(2).
118. Id.
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notice that the Directive also applies to EC corporations owned by
shareholders outside the EC.'1 9
The council realized that "it was furthermore necessary, in order to
ensure fiscal neutrality, that the profits which a subsidiary distributes to
its parent company be exempt from withholding tax."
20
In general, depending on the country, there are two ways of
ensuring that dividends are taxed only once: Under one system,
a subsidiary is not subject to withholding on dividends distributed
to its parent, but the parent must withhold tax when it distributes
the dividends received to its shareholders. The other system is
the reverse of the first. Both methods have the same result
where the dividend is redistributed by the parent company, but
not where the dividend is allocated to reserves. In the first case,
the parent company may retain the full amount, while in the
second case, the amount is reduced by the tax withheld at the
source. Withholding at the subsidiary level penalizes parent
companies whose own business activities do not produce
sufficient profits for self-financing. The other method, i.e., not
withholding taxes at the subsidiary level, eliminates this
drawback by achieving absolute tax neutrality in the allocation by
the parent company of the dividends received from its
subsidiaries: the parent company is always treated as though it
had realized the profit directly itself and not through subsidiaries.
Where parent and subsidiary are in different countries, tax is
almost always withheld when the subsidiary distributes profits to
its parent. This results in double taxation if the State of the
parent company provides for exemption of the subsidiary's
profits, i.e., for a second withholding when the parent company
redistributes the dividends. The first withholding then becomes
the final tax. That is why the Commission considered it essential
that tax not be withheld at the subsidiary level [cite omitted].
This solution is all the more justified because withholding at the
source normally represents an advance payment of tax and there
is no cause to collect it where the recipient's income is tax-
exempt. 121
119. Tomsett, supra note 102, 7, 9-10.
120. Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 22, at 6.
121. Taxation of Parent Companies and Subsidiaries, supra note 103, 3215.13.
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Except for the United Kingdom and Ireland,' the provisions of this
Directive prohibiting dividend withholding taxes are of considerable
significance since substantial withholding taxes presently are imposed on
most dividends between subsidiaries and parent companies within the
EC.123 Even though double-taxation treaties among Member States often
reduce the rates of withholding taxes substantially, rates from five to
fifteen percent typically apply to dividends paid by a subsidiary to its
parent in another Member State. 
124
Additionally, the Directive prohibits "Member States from
withholding tax, as some do at present, at the source on foreign dividends
received by their companies.125  Without this prohibition, the
exemption at the subsidiary level would become meaningless. These
States [are], however,... [able] to withhold tax when the dividends are
redistributed by the parent company. "126
This Directive has to be implemented by January 1, 1992,127 but
exceptions 12  apply to Greece,1
29  Germany,t3 and Portugal.131
First, under article 5(2), Greece does not have to comply with this
122. Tomsett, supra note 102, at 7-8.
The new directive will not, however, change the position of profits distributed by
companies resident in the United Kingdom or in the Republic of Ireland to parent
companies in other member states. This is because the United Kingdom and
Ireland do not impose any dividend withholding taxes. The advance corporation
taxes imposed in those two countries on the distribution of dividends are not
withholding taxes; indeed, [under article 7(1)] the directive specifically excludes
such taxes from its application. Similarly excluded is the French equalization tax.
Id.
123. See INTERNATIONAL TAX HANDBOOK 1990, at 625-32 (Horwath International 1990);
Maskall & Cussons, supra note 15, at 3, 18.
124. Tomsett, supra note 102, at 7.
125. Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 22, art. 6.
126. Taxation of Parent Companies and Subsidiaries, supra note 103, 3215.17. Under
article 7(1) the term "'withholding tax' [does] not cover "an advance payment or prepayment
. .. of corporation tax to the Member State of the subsidiary which is made in connection with
a distribution of profits to its parent company." Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 22,
art. 7(1).
127. Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 22, art. 8(1).
128. See generally Ministers Approve Three Directives to Eliminate Risk of Double
Taxation, 1992-The External Impact of European Unification, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 6,
at G-1.
129. See Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 22, art. 5(2).
130. See id. art. 5(3); see Agreement on Three Directives, supra note 3, at 21; Taxation of
Parent Companies and Subsidiaries, supra note 103, 3215.15.
131. Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 22, art. 5(4).
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Directive for an indefinite period. As long as Greece does not levy
corporate taxes on distributed profits, it may continue to levy a
withholding tax on profits distributed to parent companies of other
Member States. t32 Second, Germany is allowed, under article 5(3), to
impose a "compensatory withholding tax of five percent on profits
distributed by its subsidiary companies," for a transitional period up to
1996, "as long as it charges corporation tax on distributed profits at a rate
of at least 11 [percentage] points lower than the rate applicable to retained
profits.""' As mentioned above, Germany had blocked the adoption of
the three-point taxation package since 1984 because of a dispute with the
Netherlands concerning the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and specifically
regarding what level of withholding tax Germany could charge a
subsidiary during a transition period.13 4  In order to obtain Germany's
approval of the package, the Finance Ministers of the EC Member States
agreed to this exception with respect to Germany. 3 ' Thirdly, due to the
structure of the Portuguese economy, "in which most of the transnational
companies are subsidiaries and not parents, implementation of the [Parent-
Subsidiary] [D]irective [would] entail a major loss of revenue for [that]
country." 36  As a result, under article 5(4), Portugal "may levy a
withholding tax on profits distributed by its subsidiaries to parent
companies of other Member States" for an eight-year period, with a
possibility of extending this exception beyond that date. 37 The rate of
132. Greece has a unique corporate tax system within the EC in that it
allows dividend distributions to be deducted from taxable income in
computing corporate income tax but then imposes a heavy withholding
tax on the dividend distributions at rates comparable to the corporate
income tax. Accordingly, the dividend withholding tax effectively
represents the corporate income tax on distributed profits.
Tomsett, supra note 102, at 7-8.
133. Germany has an unusual corporate tax system in that there is a substantial difference
between the tax rate of corporate income tax charged on distributed profits (36%) and the rate
charged on undistributed profits (50%). Traditionally, Germany has tended to maintain high
rates of dividend withholding taxes under its double tax treaties on dividends paid by a German
subsidiary to a foreign parent company. These high rates are intended to discourage foreign
parent companies from stripping the maximum possible profits out of their German subsidiary
companies in order to maximize the proportion of profits that enjoy the lower rate of corporate
income tax. Tomsett, supra note 102, at 7-8.
134. For a complete release of this dispute, see Germany Remains Principal Obstacle to EC
Company Tax Package, WORLD TAX REP., Apr. 1989, at 83 [hereinafter Germany Remains
Principal Obstacle].
135. EC Council Approves Package, supra note 6.
136. Id.
137. The Directive provides that "[b]efore the end of the eight year the Council shall decide
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the Portuguese withholding tax, however, may not exceed fifteen percent
initially and ten percent ultimately, "subject to the existing bilateral
agreements concluded between Portugal and a Member State. "13
Finally, a question is raised about what the function of EC holding
companies will be when this Directive is implemented:
Initially it may seem as if the role of holding companies within
the EC will be much reduced, as the favorable double tax treaties
of countries such as the Netherlands and Denmark will from 1
January 1992 no longer be important for minimizing withholding
taxes on dividend flows within the EC. After that date, the
parent/subsidiary directive should result in the minimum dividend
withholding tax rates being applied to such dividend flows,
provided that the parent has a participation of at least 25 % in its
subsidiary company. Holding companies may nonetheless still be
of use when they are located in countries that provide protection
from tax on capital gains arising from future disposal of
subsidiary and associated companies. Indeed, in combination
with the parent/subsidiary directive, such holding company
structures may, in appropriate circumstances, provide a more
favorable overall tax position than was available previously.139
IV. THE TRANSFER PRICING CONVENTION
140
A. Purpose
This Convention is designed to avoid corporate double taxation arising
from transfers of profits between associated enterprises. Until it comes
into effect, difficulties can arise when one Member State, under its inter-
company transfer pricing rules, increases the taxable profits of an
enterprise. This leads to double taxation if the country of the other
enterprise involved does not reduce that enterprise's taxable income
unanimously, on a proposal from the Commission, on a possible extension of [this deviation
to comply with this Directive]." Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 22, art. 5.
138. Id. 5(4).
139. Tomsett, supra note 102, at 7, 10.
140. Transfer Pricing Convention, supra note 23, at 19. See generally Johnathan S.
Schwarz, Transfer Pricing European Style, 2 J. rr'L TAX. 120 (1991); John Turro, EC
Arbitration Treaty to Provide Solution to Transfer Pricing Disputes, 3 TAX NOTES INT'L 479
(1991); Thommes, The Arbitration Procedure Convention, WORLD TAX NEWS, Dec. 1990, at
10.
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correspondingly.1 41 Until now, these adjustments could only be made
on the basis of bilateral-double-taxation treaties.14 2  But such treaties
merely contain an obligation to enter into negotiations. 14  They do not
prescribe an absolute obligation to eliminate the double taxation, nor do
they set a time limit for the negotiation procedure. 144 As a result, "[t]his
has not proved satisfactory in many cases because of the difficulty of
obtaining agreement between the tax authorities involved." 
145
The Transfer Pricing Convention establishes a non-judicial procedure
to overcome these problems because "this double taxation is likely to
cause distortions in the conditions of competition and in capital movements
and therefore to affect the operation of the common market."1 46  Of
course, the Transfer Pricing Convention will not affect "the fulfillment of
wider obligations with respect to the elimination of double taxation in the
case of an adjustment of profits of associated enterprises resulting either
from other conventions . or from the domestic law of the Contracting
States. "147
B. Content
Under the Convention, transfer pricing is governed by both of the
arm's-length principles which are based on article 9 of the 1977
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD")
Model Double Taxation Convention on Income and on Capital:14
1. If conditions are made between related enterprises1 49 in their
141. Agreement on Three Directives, supra note 3, at 21.
142. Id.
143. Thommes, supra note 140. "These treaties generally contain a mutual agreement
provision, corresponding to article 25 of the [OECD] model treaty." Id.
144. Id.
145. Agreement on Three Directives, supra note 3, at 21.
146. The preamble to the proposal on the elimination of double taxation in connection with
the adjustment of transfers of profits between associated enterprises (arbitration procedure).
1976 O.J. (C 301) 4.
147. Transfer Pricing Convention, supra note 23, art. 15.
148. I TAX TREATIES (P-H) 1017 (1989) [hereinafter TAX TREATIES].
149. According to the Convention, enterprises are related when "(a) an enterprise of a
[Member] State participates directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital of an
enterprise of another [Member] State, or (b) the same persons participate, directly or
indirectly, in the management, control or capital of enterprises of [different Member States]."
Transfer Pricing Convention, supra note 23, art. 4(1). It was agreed that the provisions of
article 4 shall cover both cases where a transaction is carried out directly between two legally
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commercial or financial relations, which differ from those which
would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits
which would have accrued to one of the related enterprises, but
by reason of said conditions, have not so accrued, may be
included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed
accordingly. 50
2. If an enterprise of a Member State carries on business in
another Member State through a permanent establishment, then,
the profits which that establishment might be expected to make,
if it would deal independently with the enterprise of which it is
a permanent establishment, shall be attributed to that permanent
establishment. 15
The Transfer Pricing Convention does not contain any further
substantive transfer pricing rules. 52 It merely sets out the procedure to
be followed in case double taxation arises as a result of transfer pricing
adjustments by national tax authorities. However, the obligation "for
Member States to agree on transfer-pricing disputes presented to their tax
authorities may in the long term bring about common substantive standards
on [transfer pricing]. "153
If a Member State intends to adjust the profits of an enterprise in
accordance with the Convention, it has to inform the enterprise of the
intended action in due time. l - That enterprise is then given the
opportunity to inform the other enterprise involved, so that the latter may
inform the Member State in which it is situated. 55 The first Member
State may, nevertheless, make the proposed adjustment.'56 If the two
enterprises and the other Member State agree to the adjustment, neither
article 6 (mutual agreement procedure) nor article 7 (arbitration procedure)
apply. 157
distinct enterprises as well as cases where a transaction is carried out between one of the
enterprises and the permanent establishment of the other enterprise situated in a third country
(Declaration on article 4, annexed to the Convention). Id. art. 4.
150. Id. art. 4(1) (emphasis added).
151. Id. art. 4(2).
152. Thommes, supra note 140, at 10-11.
153. Id.
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If, however, an enterprise considers that the arm's-length principles
of the Convention have not been respected, it may initiate a mutual
agreement procedure of article 6." Apparently, only an effected
enterprise, and not a Member State, can initiate this procedure;15 9
however, the Member States can always advance their arguments in
informal negotiations." 6 On the basis of article 25 of the OECD Model
Double Taxation Convention, article 6 provides:
1. Where an enterprise considers that . . . the principles set out
in article 4 have not been observed, it may, irrespective of the
remedies provided by the domestic law of the [Member States]
concerned, present its case to the competent authority16 1 of the
[Member State] of which it is an enterprise or in which its
permanent establishment is situated. The case must be presented
within three years of the first notification of the action which
results or is likely to result in double taxation ...
2. If the complaint appears to be well-founded and if it is not
itself able to arrive at a satisfactory solution, the competent
authority shall endeavor to resolve the case by mutual agreement
with the competent authority of any other [Member State]
concerned, with a view to the elimination of double taxation on
the basis of the principles set out in article 4 . ...
If a mutual agreement is not reached within two years,163 an
advisory commission will be set up to deliver its opinion on the
elimination of the double taxation in question." This advisory
commission shall consist of two representatives of the relevant authorities
of the two states involved, together with an even number of independent
experts, appointed either by mutual agreement or by lot, and a chairman
so that an uneven number of members is reached.1
65
158. Id. art. 6.
159. See id. art. 6(1).
160. Id. arts. 5(3), 6(2).
161. Id. art. 3 (defines the competent authority of each Member State).
162. Id. art. 6.
163. Under article 7(1), this period has to be computed from "the date on which the case
was first submitted to one of the competent authorities in accordance with article 6(1)."
Transfer Pricing Convention, supra note 23, art. 7(1).
164. Id.
165. Id. art. 9 (concerns the composition of the advisory commission); see Corporate
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The procedural rules that apply to the advisory commission are lax
because of the commercial nature of the subject matter. The enterprises
concerned have the option of appearing or being represented before the
commission." They may "provide [any] information, evidence or
documents which seem to them likely to be of use to the advisory
commission in reaching a decision."
67  Subject to a few exceptions,1 61
only the enterprises and the competent authority of the Member States
involved shall "give effect to any request made by the advisory
commission to provide information, evidence or documents." 69  The
advisory commission has to reach a decision, by a simple majority, 70
within six months 7' and it must be based on the two basic arm's-length
principles of article 4.172 The costs of the procedure is to be shared
equally by the Member States concerned.173  Furthermore, the
Convention provides for the adoption of additional procedural rules by the
competent authorities of the Member States involved.' 74
Nonetheless, the decision of the advisory commission is not binding.
According to article 12(1), the Member States involved have to make a
final decision themselves. The final decision is to be based on the
principles of article 4 and on the advisory opinion. But the Member States
involved may make a decision which deviates from the advisory
commission's opinion. 75  The reason the Convention provides for this
"additional consultation between the countries involved after the
Taxation Measures Published, supra note 69, at 1-2.
166. Transfer Pricing Convention, supra note 23, art. 10(2).
167. Id. art. 10(1).
168. Id. art. 10(1)(a) (administrative measures contrary to domestic law or normal
administrative practice); Id. art. 10(1)(b) (supply information which is not obtainable under
domestic law or normal administrative practice); Id. art. 10(l)(c) (disclosure of trade secrets
and the like and disclosure contrary to public policy).
169. Id. art. 10(1).
170. Id. art. 11(2).
171. Id. art. 11(1).
172. Id. art. 11(1).
173. Id. art. 11(3). Article 11(3) makes an exception, of course, for the costs incurred by
the associated enterprises. ld.
174. ld. art. 11(2).
175. Id. art. 12(1). But see Proposal for a Council Directive on the Elimination of Double
Taxation, art. 3(1), 1976 O.J. (C 301) 4. Article 3(1) provides that "[ilt, in applying [the
mutual agreement procedure], the tax authorities concerned fail to reach an agreement that
eliminates the double taxation, they shall present the case to a commission, whose decision they
shall agree from the outset to accept." Id. (emphasis added). This implied, however, that the
Member States could refuse, at the outset, to comply with the decision. Id.
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commission has issued its opinion" is that "Member States were not
prepared to subject themselves automatically to the decision of a
commission with powers to arbitrate."1 76 If the Member States fail to
reach an agreement, however, they shall be bound to act in accordance
with the advisory opinion. 77  It is only in this sense that this Convention
is a true "arbitration" convention.
Overall this Convention creates two "hard"171 obligations: 7 9  (1)
the Member States have to eliminate the existing double taxation 8 '
through the mutual agreement procedure, or otherwise through the
arbitration procedure; and (2) the Member States have to conclude the case
within three years. On the other hand, Member States and enterprises
retain certain rights: (1) enterprises may have recourse to available
domestic remedies;"' and (2) the submission of the case to an advisory
commission shall bar a member state from initiating or continuing judicial
or administrative proceedings after the submission of the case to the
advisory commission' 82-subject to two exceptions:'83  (1) the case
need not be submitted to an advisory commission when the domestic law
of a Member State involved does not allow it to derogate from the
decisions of its judicial bodies;"M and (2) a Member State is not obliged
to initiate the mutual agreement procedure or to submit the case to an
advisory commission if a final ruling under its domestic law holds one of
the enterprises concerned liable for a serious penalty. '8
176. Thommes, supra note 140, at 10-11.
177. Transfer Pricing Convention, supra note 23, art. 12(1).
178. The question remains, of course, how to enforce these obligations as long as the EC
Court of Justice has no jurisdiction to review the Convention's application.
179. Thommes, supra note 140, at 10-11.
180. According to the Convention, the double taxation of profits is deemed to be eliminated
if either "(1) the profits are included in the computation of taxable profits in one State only or
(2) the tax chargeable on those profits in one State is reduced by an amount equal to the tax
chargeable on them in the other." Transfer Pricing Convention, supra note 23, art. 14.
181. Id. arts. 6(1), 7(1).
182. Id. art. 7(2).
183. Id. These exceptions are: (1) the associated enterprise of that Member State has
allowed the time provided for appeal to expire; or (2) that enterprise has withdrawn any such
appeal before a decision has been delivered. Id. art. 73.
184. Transfer Pricing Convention, supra note 23, art. 7(3).
185. Transfer Pricing Convention, supra note 23, arts. 8(1), 8(2). For the Member States'
interpretations of "a serious penalty," see Transfer Pricing Convention, supra note 23, at 22-
24. These interpretations "reveal a tendency to extend the concept of 'serious penalty' even
to marginal infringements, such as the delayed submission of tax returns. The future will show
whether these extended interpretations will considerably restrict the application of the
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Although the Transfer Pricing Convention was initially embodied in
a directive, the council, in the end, preferred the convention format.
18 6
Article 220 of the EEC Treaty endorses this method. 87 The approach
chosen in no way modifies the substance of the measure." It simply
means that the advisory committee will lie outside the EC structure. 9
This implies that "the Commission will have no role in supervising the
functioning of the [committee]'" or the application of the convention
in general 9' and that companies will not be able to challenge its
decisions before the EC Court of Justice."9 Furthermore, unlike a
directive, the convention will enter into force after it has been ratified by
all Member States (or Contracting States). 93 It will run for an initial
period of five years."9  According to the Convention, the Member
States will meet "six months before the [expiration] of that period ... to
decide [by unanimous vote] on the extension of [the] Convention...
" 9' Because a single transfer pricing case may easily take three years
to decide, the five-year period seems too short.'96
The Member States seemed to be very hesitant to adopt the rules of
this convention. That is probably the reason they chose the convention
format. Under the convention they still need ratification in the national
parliaments, and they can review the convention after five years. If,
however, in practice the convention proves successful, "it may be
extended beyond the present five-year time limit" and the Member States
convention." Thommes, supra note 140, at 10, 12.
186. Council Reaches Agreement, supra note 3, 95,505.
187. Article 220 reads, in part: "Member States shall, so far as is necessary, enter into
negotiations with each other with a view to securing for the benefit of their nationals . . . the
abolition of double taxation within the Community. . ." EEC TREATY, supra note 4, art. 220.
188. Council Reaches Agreement, supra note 3, 95,505.
189. EC Council Approves Package, supra note 6.
190. Id.
191. Thommes, supra note 140, at 10, 12.
192. EC Council Approves Package, supra note 6. This could be overcome by a protocol
to the Convention endowing the Court of Justice with the authority to interpret the Convention
and to review the arbitration panel's decisions. A precedent for this approach is the EEC
Convention of June 19, 1980 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations which was
supplemented by such a protocol of December 19, 1988, reprinted in RICHARD PLEUDER,
EUROPEAN CONTRACTs CONVENTION-THE ROME CONVENTION ON THE CHOICE OF LAW FOR
CONTRACTS 293 (1991).
193. Transfer Pricing Convention, supra note 23, arts. 17-18.
194. Id. art. 20.
195. Id.
196. Id.; Thommes, supra note 140, at 10, 12. Furthermore, "[nlo provision has been
made for the settlement of cases still pending at the time the convention expires." Id.
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may confer jurisdiction over the Convention on the EC Court of
Justice. 197
V. THE PROPOSED INTEREST AND ROYALTIES DIRECTIVE
The proposed Interest and Royalties Directive 9 ' will restrict
Member States from imposing withholding taxes on interest and royalties
("I&R") paid between related parties (minimum holding of twenty-five
percent).' Portugal and Greece, which are primarily importers of
technology and capital and host countries of subsidiaries, have to abolish
these withholding taxes gradually over a period of seven years.200
Unlike I&R payments within one Member State, at present, cross-
border I&R payments are usually subject to withholding tax in the country
of the payor, 2°' except when bilateral double taxation treaties between
Member States eliminate this withholding tax.202 Since the country of
the payee normally taxes I&R income, these payments are subject to
double taxation. Clearly, this penalizes companies operating in different
EC Member States through a parent-subsidiary corporate structure.
Therefore, these withholding taxes will be abolished.
As a result, this tax measure furthers the establishment of parent-
subsidiary combinations. In this sense, the proposed I&R Directive is a
corollary of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive in that sense. 203  As such,
the proposal is closely "modeled after the Parent-Subsidiary Directive..
S."24 This will facilitate the application of this proposed Directive in
that companies can use the same administrative procedures and documents
as those provided for in the framework of the Parent-Subsidiary
197. Thommes, supra note 140, at 10, 12.
198. See generally Jonathan S. Schwarz, EC Directives Cover Cross-Border Income Flows,
2 J. INT'L TAx. 180 (1991).
199. Two Proposals, supra note 26, at G-4.
200. Up to 10% during the first five years and up to five percent during the last two years.
Single Market Reality, supra note 1, at 2.
201. See EC PRESS RELEASE Nov. 28, 1990, supra note 28, annex 1.
202. But even where bilateral double taxation treaties "between the various member states
theoretically eliminate this double taxation, industry experts said that it is often very difficult
to eliminate it in practice." Corporate Tax Plan, supra note 45, at 5.
203. The Interest and Royalties Directive "aims to extend to interest and royalty payments
EEC legislation exempting withholding tax for transfers of dividends between parent companies
and subsidiaries." Two Proposals, supra note 26.
204. EC to Prepare Draft Interest Royalty Withholding Directive, Official Says, Daily Tax
Rep. (BNA) No. 202, at G-7.
[Vol. 13
CORPORATE TAXATION
Directive. 5 This measure may be extended later to other types of inter-
company transactions as the internal market is further established.20 6
VI. THE PROPOSED CARRY-OVER OF LOSSES DIRECTIE
To facilitate cross-border expansion of EC companies, the
Commission has proposed a measure that would take into account the
losses of permanent establishments and subsidiaries located in other
Member States. 2" During the start-up phase, such transfrontier
activities usually generate losses. 20 ' The proposed Carry-Over of Losses
Directive "will have a positive effect on an undertaking's cash position,
enabling it to bear start-up losses more easily." 2°9
In case of a permanent establishment,210 it would not be
economically sound if the mere fact that a permanent establishment is
separated from its head office by a frontier prevented the undertaking from
deducting the losses incurred by the permanent establishment.2" To
solve this problem some Member States already allow foreign taxes to be
taken into account through the imputation or tax credit method or through
the deduction method with subsequent re-incorporation. 1 2  However,
until now, there has been "little consistency in the way in which . . .
business losses are dealt with across the [EC]. "
213
Therefore, the proposed Directive offers Member States a choice
between these two methods. Under the first method, the imputation
method, the result (gain or loss) of a permanent establishment is entirely
205. Single Market Reality, supra note 1.
206. Id. at 2.
207. id. at 1, 3; Full Text of the 1991 Proposed EC Directive to Allow Cross-Border Loss
Deductions, 4 TAx NoTEs INT'L 884 (1992); see Two Proposals, supra note 26; BREALEY &
QUIGLEY, supra note 7, at 222.
208. Single Market Reality, supra note 1, at 3.
209. id. at 3.
210. The proposed Directive defines a permanent establishment in accordance with article
5 of the 1977 OECD Model Double Taxation Convention on Income and on Capital, reprinted
in TAX TREATIES, supra note 148, 1017.
211. Id.; Single Market Reality, supra note 1, at 3.
212. Single Market Reality, supra note 1, at 3. For a brief explanation of the tax treatment
of corporate losses in the different EC Member States, see EC PRESS RELEASE Nov. 28, 1990,
supra note 28, annex 3-4. For an explanation of these methods, see infra annex 1, 2.
213. Cussons et al., supra note 11, at 14-15, 21. "Only five Member States allow any
form of carry-back; while all Member States permit some period of carry-forward, only three
impose no time limit and a five year limit is the norm." Id. at 15.
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included in the result of its head office.21 4 This ensures the carry-over
of all losses of a permanent establishment.2 5 To prevent double taxation
of a permanent establishment's profits, a tax credit is accorded to the head
office equal to the tax paid in the country of the permanent
establishment.216
The second method, the deduction method with subsequent
reintegration, exempts the profits of a permanent establishment in the
country of its head office.217 The losses, however, can be deducted
from the profit of the head office. 218  To allow Member States to
recover the ensuing reduction of their tax income, the directive for the
reintegration of subsequent profits of the permanent establishment are
reintegrated into the profits of the head office.21 9
In the case of subsidiaries, most Member States do not permit, even
under international agreements, the carry-over of their losses if the
subsidiaries are located abroad. 22' The Commission's proposal extends
the application of the deduction method with subsequent reintegration to
subsidiaries under certain conditions.22 In fact, since the function of a
subsidiary is economically akin to that of a permanent establishment,222
it makes little sense to deny this advantage to subsidiaries. 223 But certain
countries, such as Italy, are opposed to an extension of loss consolidation
to subsidiaries.' 4
To prevent fraud, however, this measure would only apply to
subsidiaries where the parent company owns seventy-five percent of its
shares and the majority of its voting rights. 2' Nevertheless, Member
214. Propositions de Directives en Matiire de Fiscaliti des Entreprises, EC PRESS
RELEASE, (Brussels Press), Nov. 28, 1990, 1, 5 [hereinafter Propositions de Directives.
215. Id.
216. Id. For an example of this method, see infra annex 1, which is based on Fiche
Technique 2, EC PRESS RELEASE, (Brussels Press), Nov. 28, 1990 [hereinafter Fiche
Technique 21.
217. Propositions de Directives, supra note 214, at 1, 5.
218. Id.
219. Id. For an example of this method, see infra annex 2, which is based on Fiche
Technique 2, supra note 216.
220. See EC PRESS RELEASE, supra note 28, annex 3-4.
221. Id.
222. id. at 5-6.
223. Id. at 6.




States could reduce these thresholds226 and further, would be allowed to
extend the benefits of this proposed Directive to permanent establishments
and subsidiaries located outside the EC.22 7
VII. CONCLUSION
The adoption of the corporate tax measures discussed in this article
is an important step towards the abolition of fiscal borders within the EC
and towards the establishment of the internal market by the end of
1992.228 These measures affect national tax laws that penalize
companies operating in several Member States, and, as a result, most
instances of double taxation will be eliminated. Under the Merger
Directive, cross-border mergers and reorganizations will no longer be
taxed differently than purely domestic mergers and reorganizations. Under
the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, the proposed Interest and Royalties
Directive, and the proposed Carry-Over of Losses Directive, cross-border
parent-subsidiary structures will not be treated differently in tax terms than
purely domestic parent-subsidiary structures. Finally, under the Transfer
Pricing Convention, Member States will eliminate any double taxation
arising from transfer-pricing adjustments by national tax authorities.
Several issues, however, still need to be addressed.229 First, there
are no uniform transfer-pricing rules within the EC. Such rules are the
ultimate means of preventing double taxation of cross-border transactions
among related parties. Since the Transfer Pricing Convention was adopted
quite hesitantly, it is doubtful whether an agreement on substantive
transfer-pricing rules will be reached in the near future. Secondly, the EC
Member States have different kinds of tax incentives to attract foreign
investment. 230 This gives Member States an unequal opportunity to
226. Fiche Technique 2, supra note 216.
227. Id.
228. See generally, Scrivener Talks on Taxation, the Internal Market and the U.S., 653
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10 (1990); see Boudewijn Barre, New Directions, WORLD TAX
NEWS, Dec. 1990, at 13; Karl M. Meessen, Europe en Route to 1992: The Completion of the
Internal Market and Its Impact on Non-Europeans, 23 INT'L LAW. 359 (1989); Martin
Bangemann, Fortress Europe: The Myth, 9 Nw. J. OF INT'L L. & Bus. 480 (1989); Cockburn,
Complexity and Chaos: Effect of EEC Tax Harmonization in European Business Ventures, 125
TA'N 66 (1990); David M. Benson, Europe 1992 and Corporate Taxes: A U.S. Perspective,
19 TAX MOMaI'. INT'L J. 216 (1990); Eleanor Lewis & Mark Goldstein, The Effect of EC 1992
on U.S. Companies: A U.S. Government Perspective (European Unification 1992:
Implications for Europe and the U.S.), 3 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 153 (1989).
229. See Barre, supra note 228, at 13-14.
230. See Maskall & Cussons, supra note 15, at 3, 12-15 (summarizes the various tax
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attract investment. 23' These incentive programs, therefore, have to be
standardized to some degree. If this happens, it is likely that the minimal
incentives will become the standard 232 and would result in a general
erosion of these benefits and a corresponding increase in tax costs for
multinational groups operating in the EC. 3  Finally, discriminatory tax
practices must be abolished. For example, foreign corporations'
subsidiaries and branches should not be taxed differently.
It is undisputed that the business community will benefit substantially
from the establishment of a true internal market within the EC. The most
direct and immediate advantage to industry and commerce will be the
considerable reduction of red tape. Goods and services will no longer
bear the unnecessary cost of delay and bureaucracy. Harmonization of
corporate taxation, for its part, is vital to the completion of the internal
market. Corporate taxation, which is both less complicated and more
standardized will be benefit all investors in the EC.
incentives given by EC Member States).
231. Id. atS.
232. Id. at 6.
233. Id. at 5. "This is gradually happening, e.g., the original rules for Belgium's co-




Appendix: Taxation of the European Economic Interest
Grouping and the European Company
Two other important developments concerning corporate taxation in
the EC have taken place. They will be mentioned very briefly in this
Appendix.
First, on July 1, 1989, the EC witnessed the birth of a new legal
entity: the European Economic Interest Grouping ("EEIG"). 23"  The
EEIG was created "to facilitate or to develop the economic activities of its
members and to improve or to increase the results of those activities. 235
The main aim of the EEIG is thus
to enable [its members] to develop their own particular activities
and to increase profits by combining activities, resources or
services .... Consequently, the EEIG must neither replace its
members nor absorb their activities. It is an instrument for
economic co-operation not for integration. [Also, the primary]
purpose of the [EEIG] is not to make profits . . . the
achievement of profits by the grouping itself is viewed as
secondary and ancillary. 6
Concerning the taxation of an EEIG, the EEIG Regulation provides that
the profits or losses resulting from the EEIG's activities are deemed to be
the profits or losses of its members and shall be apportioned among them
and taxed according to the proportions laid down in the contract that
creates the EEIG.237
Second, on August 25, 1989, the proposed Statute for a European
Company was amended." The European Company is referred to as
"SE," which comes from the Latin term "Societas Europaea." The
234. Council Regulation (EEC) 2137/85 of 25 July 1985 R.20.8.2 on the EEIG, 1985 O.J.
(L 199) 1 (entered in effect on July 1, 1990) [hereinafter Council Regulation 21317/85]. For
an extensive monograph on the EEIG, EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPINGS (K. Van
Gerven & C. Aalders eds. 1990).
235. EEC European File, EEIG, Apr., 1989, at 3, quoted in Taxation of European
Economic Interest Groupings: The Inland Revenue Consultative Document, 1 BRITISH TAX
REV. 7 (1990).
236. Id. at 7-8.
237. Council Regulation 2137/85, supra note 234, at 6, 9.
238. Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a European Company, 1989 O.J.
(C 263) 41 [hereinafter European Company Proposal].
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Statute would allow transnational companies to be established under EC
law, rather than national law. The statute is highly complex, however,
and is unlikely to be agreed to for several years, if ever.239 The creation
of an SE has lost much of its purpose since such a company can, among
other possibilities, also be created by merging companies of different
Member States.'
Moreover, for tax matters, the SE would continue to be subject to the
laws of each Member State in which it is located. The proposal tries to
make the SE more attractive through a tax incentive. Indeed, the proposal
provides that if the operations of permanent establishments of an SE in a
Member State or in a non-Member State result in a net loss, "that loss
may be set against the profits of the SE in the State where it is resident for
tax purposes. Subsequent profits of the permanent establishments of the
SE in another State shall constitute taxable income of the SE ... up to the
amount of the losses imputed."241 Member States may, however, choose
not to apply these principles if double taxation would be avoided "by
allowing the SE to set the tax already paid by its permanent establishments
against the tax due from it in respect of the profits realized by those
permanent establishments. "2
These are considerable tax advantages, but they will lose their specific
attractiveness when these incentives are extended to all European
companies on the basis of the Carry-Over of Losses Directive as discussed
above. 43
239. Germany Remains Principal Obstacle, supra note 134, at 83.
240. Tax Treatment, supra note 63, 3213.01.
241. European Company Proposal, supra note 23%, art. 133(1)-(2), 67-6%.
242. Id. art. 133(4).
243. Two Proposals, supra note 26.
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Annex 1: Functioning of the Imputation Method
Consolidated taxation of the Headoffice in Country A and the Permanent
Establishment in Country B:





Countries A & B:
Taxation of Profit of Headoffice:





Total Taxation in A:
Total Worldwide Taxation in
First Year:
Taxation of the Permanent
Establishment in Country B
(tax rate: 40%)
100 Profit:









Countries A & B:







Countries A & B:
Taxation of Profit of Headoffice:
Minus Taxes paid
in B (imputation):
Total Taxation in Third Year:






100 Taxation by Country B:
(100)
1992]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Annex 2: Functioning of the Deduction Method with Subsequent
Reintegration
Consolidated taxation of the Headoffice in Country A and the Permanent
Establishment in Country B:
Unlike the imputation method in Annex 1, under the deduction method with
subsequent reintegration, the profits of a permanent establishment are not taxed in
Country A.
Headoffice in Country A
(Tax rate: 50%)




Taxation of Profit of Headoffice





Taxation by Country B:
Second Year:
Profit/(Loss):
Taxable Profit after Imputation
of Loss in B:
Total Taxation in Second Year:
100 Profit/(Loss):
Taxable profit after Imputation
100 of Loss in B:
0 Total Taxation in Second Year:
Third Year:
Profit:
Reintegration of Profit of
Permanent Establishment




Total Taxation in Third Year:
Total Taxation for Entire Period:
100 Profit:
Reintegration of Profit of
Permanent Establishment
after Imputation of loss
100 in Second Year:
200 Total Profit:
100 Taxation:
(100)
(100)
0
100
(100)
0
0
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